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PRIVATE STANDING AND PUBLIC VALUES
Michael Boudin*
LEGAL IDENTITY: Tm: COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW. By
Joseph Vining. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
1978. Pp. xiii, 256. $16.00.

This highly interesting and unusual book has, as a central
subject of inquiry, the developing law of standing in federal administrative litigation. It also has a predominating interest or
perspective: the concept of legal identity and the role of litigants
in personifying social values. Finally, its underlying thesis reflects
Professor Vining's judgment that there is underway a basic
change in the ordering principles of our legal process. The book
thus concerns the interplay between these subjects-standing,
legal identity, and the values that underlie the legal order.

I
The common law affords a long history of legal challenges to
executive and administrative action, but only in the present century has this branch of litigation moved from the periphery to the
forefront. As our economy and society have grown more complex
and interdependent, the occasions for governmental regulation
and intervention have vastly increased. In this cycle, action or
inaction by the government comes to affect more people in more
ways. The opportunity to challenge governmental conduct in
court thus becomes ever more vital. So in turn do threshold doctrines-like standing-which narrow or widen that opportunity.•
Professor Vining begins his inquiry with the traditional legal
order in which disputes about property were a paradigm of litigation and the protection of property rights was a basic function of
the courts (ch. 2). 2 It was natural for developing civil litigation
against government officials to be shaped to fit within the existing framework. Consonantly, suing an official implicated an inquiry whether the official had invaded the complainant's prop* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A. 1961, LL.B. 1964, Harvard University.-Ed.
1. Professor Vining has also written in depth about another of the so-called threshold
requirements, the "ripeness" doctrine. See Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 M1cH. L. REv. 1443 (1971).
2. J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978).
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erty rights or analogously protected legal interest (e.g., liberty of
person) such that, if the official were a private defendant, he
would be liable to suit. Only if this invasion were demonstrated
would the court have to address the further question whether the
official's actions were justified by virtue
. of his official mandate
(which in tum implicated questions of his jurisdiction, the proper
exercise of his authority, and other now familiar grist of administrative litigation).
As Professor Vining explains, this framework became increasingly unsatisfactory. One reason was that individuals and
business enterprises found that their own ip.terests could be drastically affected by official action, or even inaction, directed solely
at another entity: for example, a contract awarded to a competitor, a rate change ordered for shipment of its commodities, a
failure to prohibit its misconduct. Litigants also perceived, and
wished to challenge, the impact of official action on what are
loosely called noneconomic interests, such as aesthetic or recreational values. In both Professor Vining's examples, and surely in
other contexts as well, the traditional precondition of relief-a
property or liberty interest-could not readily be established,
even though the practical effect of the official action or inaction
on the would-be litigant might be hard to deny.
Courts were not, of course, limited to ignoring repeated demands for review in such cases or, in the alternative, twisting
notions of property and liberty out of recognition in order to afford review. A third course was to abandon old requirements and
to evolve new standards for determining when judicial intervention might be justified (ch. 3). The new touchstones that emerged
included resort to the particular language of the regulatory statute, professed discovery by courts of a "beneficiary" class intended _by the legislature to have a right of review, the "private
attorney general" concept and-most recently-the notion of a
"zone" of protected or regulated "interests." A portion of the
book is devoted to showing why certain of the older touchstones
are unsound guides to resolution of standing questions today (chs.
5-7).
Professor Vining's second general subject-"legal identity"-is essentially another way of posing the question of standing. In his use of the phrase, it involves the court's willingness or
unwillingness to recognize before it a person or entity entitled to
invoke the court's authority. 3 And, in standing cases, discerning
3. Lawyers are more familiar with the concept, if not the phrase,· in a different,
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"who" is before the court to object to an official action often
involves the court's perception of the interest or value that concerns or is represented by the petitioner. Of course, the cast of
would-be litigants may cover a broad spectrum even though only
a single official action has occurred. 4
As I understand Professor Vining, he is suggesting that the
question who may sue has tended to become a different kind of
question as the scope of governmental action has expanded and
its impact has become at once more various and widespread. In
resolving standing questions, judicial concern with the complaining individual and "his" personal stake has diminished; and increasingly, petitioners in difficult standing cases are viewed as
representing interested classes such as "consumers," "environmentalists," or "competitors." Ultimately, the class may be
entirely abstracted-e.g., will the court grant standing in this
type of case to those plausibly professing injury to their environmental interests-and we will have reached the "personification"
of values.
In Professor Vining's terms, when the personified value is
recognized by a court as a basis for standing, it becomes a
"public" value. For example:
Consider whether an individual who does not swim is
"directly" and "personally" affected by a decision not to build a
swimming pool. As a "parent," perhaps he may be: Parent and
child are seen as one. As one who enjoys, perhaps passionately
enjoys, watching swimming? That would depend on whether swimming watching is understood and valued as something more than
an idiosyncracy. It may become so with the televising of Olympic
swimming and the spread of swimming as an art rather than a
splashing. [P. 176]

Yet a neighbor opposing the pool's construction because he disliked the blue-green color of the water may never win recognition
and be accorded standing to sue, however great his aversion to the
color or his willingness to litigate. His "value" will be described,
often without explanation, as a mere preference or idiosyncracy. 5
although related, context: determining whether a litigant has "capacity" to sue (e.g., a
child, a trust, a union).
4. For example, the petitioner challenging the condemnation of a house may be a
home owner whose property is at stake, neighbors concerned with urban blight from
construction of a new jail on the site, or a historical society seeking to preserve Georgian
architecture. The illegality charged may be related to, or largely independent of, any of
those concerns.
5. As Professor Vining observes, the process of establishing public values also operates in reverse. Values once accorded weight (e.g., distinction in social rank)-and at least
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Connecting these concepts-legal identity and evolution of
public values-is not the end point of Professor Vining's inquiry.
True, the concepts may serve as a prism for examining standing
cases, helping to explain puzzling decisions or to predict the outcome of cases not yet decided. However, Professor Vining has a
further and more ambitious objective: to relate the development
of the standing doctrine to a basic change in the role of courts in
the legal process and in the values underlying our legal order.
In his broad view, legislation and administration can be
viewed as an ongoing, experimental resolution of diverse interests
and values (ch. 9). No single interest or value predominates in the
society, any more than it does in any sane person, and there is
no permanent hierarchy of interests or values. Instead, as society
changes, different public values emerge and the governmental
process seeks to accommodate them. Through decisions on standing, courts help evolve the public values that will be recognized
in this continuing process (ch. 10). "For in the very recognition
of a 'person' who is 'harmed' courts formally cap the formulation
of a value . . . , confirm it in our language and our thought, and
permit a full and continuous search for its realization to begin"
(p. 171).

Finally, this process of continuing accommodation itself represents an ordering principle that is becoming woven into our
legal fabric. In the past, Professor Vining concludes, litigation has
symbolized a legal order of clashing and exclusive claims to property-a world in the image of "castles upon hilltops" (p. 181).
That world is increasingly remote and irrelevant as society has
changed and as courts have become ever more sensitive to diverse
values and remote effects. Both in function and as symbol, the
emerging public litigation may come to reflect not the separate
claims of individuals, but the vital interdependence of society.

n
In 1970, the Supreme Court announced a new formulation of
standing doctrine designed to sweep away old cobwebs. Standing,
it said, exists where the petitioner shows that he is injured "in
fact" by administrative action and the "interest" asserted arguably falls within the "zone of interests" the statute in question
was meant to protect or regulate. 8 Eight years later Professor
potentially significant in litigation-may cease to be recognized.
6. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.150 (1970);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 169 (1970).
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Vining is prepared to describe recent standing decisions as evidencing "intellectual crisis" and judicial behavior which is "erratic, even bizarre" {p. 1). He is not alone is his dissatisfaction.7
My own sense is that, whatever the doctrine of standing
should be, at the present time the doctrine has in. practice no
single rationale or office. It is an umbrella term sheltering a number of different impulses or considerations. This engenders exactly the confusion one might expect if, in a large family, all of
the children were called by the same name. 8 It also helps to explain why standing decisions cannot easily be made to conform
to a single pattern.
Surely one consideration underlying the standing doctrine is
a sense that a litigant should be seen to be affected by the action
he seeks to challenge before the wheels of litigation are set in
motion. This requisite may not be invariable; and standing is not
the only doctrine concerned with assuring the litigant's personal
stake. However, as Sierra Club v. Morton9 demonstrates, federal
judges usually want more than a litigant and a stake: they want
a connection between the two.
Even if the requisite stake and connection exist, however, the
litigant's interest may be illegal, unwholesome, or otherwise unattractive to the court even if the governmental action is clearly
unlawful. Or, the litigant's interest may be protected in some
other context but may be so unrelated to the purpose for which
the substantive rule was established that the court may see no
reason to enforce the rule for the benefit of the litigant. Or, allowing one class of litigants to sue may interfere with anticipated
litigation by another class of litigants to whom policy gives prefer:
ence. The list could readily be extended.
Standing is complicated by yet another of its traits. Various
of the considerations treated under the standing doctrine are associated not only with standing but also with still other threshold
7. Professor Davis approved of the injury-in-fact test but observed that in subsequent
standing decisions the Supreme Court was divided in virtually every case. K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.00, at 485-87 (1976). By 1977 Professor Davis
was driven to conclude: "The whole law of standing is so confused and cluttered . . . that
the lower courts and practitioners especially need Supreme Court guidance." Id. § 22.00.01, at 167 (Supp. 1977).
8. The evolution of more precise nomenclature probably has more to do with legal
development than one might at first suppose. In contrast to standing, consider the wellaccepted distinction between "personal" and "subject matter" jurisdiction and the distinction, still occasionally compromised, between the merger/bar doctrine and collateral
estoppel.
9. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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prerequisites (e.g., the case or controversy requirement) or with
what we call the merits of the case. Whether one or another of the
considerations is resolved by a decision on standing or in another
phase of the opinion may be a matter of how the case was argued.
Standing is not only a crowd, but a disorderly and wandering one.
It is no wonder that judicial policemen have such trouble with it.
Given the diversity of elements and the overlap of standing
with other doctrines and with the merits, it is quite possible to
decide, as a matter of policy, that certain "standing" considerations-possibly all of them-should be detached from the standing concept and considered, if at all, under other heads, such as
the merits. In fact, much of the current literature on standing
seems to urge a recasting of the standing doctrine to simplify it,
distinguish its elements, or even abolish it as an independent
test. 10
Quite apart from the multiple roles played by the standing
doctrine, there are also multiple functions performed by judicial
review of agency action. Assuring respect for public values and
evolving those values is a part of process, but reviewing courts
often have other things on their minds. Depending on the case at
hand, the court's attention may range from fixing the final outcome of the controversy to its own program of agency reform only
remotely related to any individual controversy.
Which of the various functions are proper, and when, raises
a quite different set of problems. However, since courts do in fact
exercise a range of functions in reviewing administrative action,
it seems reasonable to suppose that these other functions may
also shape the use that courts make of the standing doctrine and
thereby shape the doctrine itself. A court persuaded by the merits
to shake an agency by the neck may have only limited interest
in "who" asked it to do so.
There is also a reverse side to the coin. Standing is one of the
barriers to judicial review of official action. Like most such barriers, it has been pushed back further and further in recent years
as courts have grown ever more ready to police, improve, and
reform in matters once thought beyond the purview of judges.
The extension of standing to new or remote interests, like the
presumption of reviewability and the demand for "reasoned"
supra note 7, § 22.00, at 486; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
459-500 (1965); Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claims for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Scott,
Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HAnv. L. REV. 645 (1973).
10. E.g., K.

DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
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dedsion-making, has gained a propulsive, almost irresistible life
of its own. In this respect, the Administrative Procedure Act 11 has
become a symbol far more potent than its express language.
Yet, there are countervailing pressures that resist judicial
review and those pressures may in fact be stimulated by the
outcome of such intervention. Even in an interdependent society,
limits exist on what can be achieved through judicial review.
Moreover, there are positive costs of intervention, including expense for litigants, judicial and administrative delay, and substitution of lay decision-making for asserted expertise. There is still
some terrain, such as foreign and military affairs, which most
judges are inclined to avoid. The future of the standing doctrine
may depend, to a considerable degree, on how far it becomes the
channel for the pressures and reservations that tend to limit intervention by courts.
Professor Vining's book develops and illuminates a central
function of the standing doctrine: its role, through the personification of public values, in developing the interests society is prepared to protect. Like most "models"-a skeleton, a diagram of
blood vessels, a chart of the nervous system-this model of the
standing doctrine teaches by isolating, emphasizing, ,and explaining a single central theme. No reader should need reminding that
this is not the only theme. Rather, it is the theme that Professor
Vining has chosen in order to illustrate and illuminate arguments
and ideas that go far beyond the bounds of standing doctrine.
ill
One of the greatest attractions of this book is that it spins
off intellectual sparks at a great rate. Some it fans into flames.
Others smolder. A few get stamped out rather firmly. Several
examples may be of interest.
A two-page "note" traces the history of standing as a legal
term of art {pp. 55-56). Standing sounds to our ears like so familiar and basic a requisite that it is natural to seek its source in the
common-law. But, as Professor Vining observes, common-law
courts with authority defined by a system of writs "did not need
to speak of standing. The question was whether a challenger was
entitled to a writ, whether he had a cause of action, whether the
writ lay" {p. 55). Compactly, determinations of standing, merits,
11. E.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
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and remedy were all embraced by the definition of the particular
writ.
Standing-properly, locus standi-instead apparently
emerged in parliamentary practice as a threshold requirement for
those who sought to appear before parliamentary committees to
oppose legislation {p. 55). Unless the bill would directly affect the
opponent's property or interest, he could not speak against it (p.
55).12 Not until the 1930s did courts in the United States begin
commonly to talk of standing, although earlier references exist (p.
56). There is something more than antiquarian interest in tracing
standing into the parliamentary world, especially for us whose
courts play so significant a role in the governmental process.
Later in the book, Professor Vining devotes a chapter to what
he calls "feigned personalities" (ch. 8). If the applicable standing
doctrine allows a "consumer" but not a "competitor" to challenge
an agency ruling on a company's advertising practices, what does
the court say to the competitor who seeks to make the challenge
and asserts that he too is a consumer? When should courts explore the underlying motivation or test the bona fides of the litigant in playing the role the litigant purports to fill? And may it
be that the feigned role "fuels the popular sense . . . that law is
a thing to be used and the profession a place for persons of manipulative mind and empty heart" (pp. 125-26)?
This problem is intimately related to standing, or at least to
any doctrine of standing that purports to turn on the interests
being represented or protected. The chapter on feigned personali•ties makes brief excursions into other fields of law where the
origins and purposes of the suit may, or may not, be a basis for
halting the challenger at the threshold (pp. 124-35).13 Since this
broader subject could exhaust a volume itself, Professor Vining
cannot reasonably do more than touch upon it, but one may still
welcome and enjoy a new vista.
At yet another point, Professor Vining discusses more briefly
the implied private cause of action {pp. 107-09). Thus, where the
statute forbids construction work to commence before 8:00 A.M.,
a neighbor may seek to sue to enjoin work at an earlier hour, and
12. By 1866, a treatise writer quoted by Professor Vining (p. 66) was complaining,
with a distinctly familiar ring, that the precedents on standing were "most unsatisfactory"
and that "[i]n many cases the legal advisers of petitioners were unable to make more
than a mere guess as to whether their locus standi would be allowed or disallowed."
13. Among other instances cited are problems of invoking diversity jurisdiction by
collusive assignment and the testing of shareholder motivation in suits, derivative or
otherwise, to implement shareholder rights.
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the statute may be silent on the issue of who, if anyone, is entitled to relief. There are both parallels and divergencies in comparing this doctrine with standing to challenge administrative
action. In both cases, a ~le has allegedly been disregarded by
the intended defendant and the question is whether the private
plaintiff will be allowed to demonstrate this disregard and obtain
a judicial remedy.
On the other hand, the implied cause of action is
usually-but not always-invoked to secure damages rather than
prospective relief; and there is usually an official prosecutor or
enforcement agency primarily charged with enforcing the rule in
question. 14 It is not necessary here to describe the specialized use
of the comparison made by Professor Vining. Rather, my point is
that the comparison of standing and the implied cause of action
is a valuable one that could readily be extended in a number of
directions. Thus, the book is a continuing provocation to readers
to carry its hints and suggestions beyond the author's own main
theses.
It is also a book of extreme intellectual density. The thoughts
are compressed so that the cautious reader, anxious not to miss
a point, is constantly chipping out sentences to consider their
implications and relationship to other thoughts. The writing is
crafted, exact, indeed elegant, but the book is written at a very
high level of abstraction. If written in the conventional style of
an ordinary law review article, it would be several times its present length.
Fortunately, the style of the book is quite personal. Its high
level of abstraction and analysis is enriched with illustrative examples, occasional dialogues, images, and wit. Equally unusual
are the almost aphoristic passages or remarks which appear from
time to time. While pertinent to the legal analysis, they could
readily appear in a book of literary criticism or a spectatorial
essay. For some, these passages will be the plums in a very fine
pie.
The question what a judge "sees" in looking at a litigant is
at once the most speculative and practical of questions. Chesterton once remarked that the callousness of courts _and lawyers
toward the accused in the dock is not the result of deliberate
cruelty; it is rather that they do not see the prisoner at all but
14. Of course, in standing cases there may often be another class of petitioners who
clearly do have standing to challenge the administrative action.
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only "the usual man in the usual place." By bringing his spacious
style and perspective to bear on what is commonly thought to be
a dry and technical subject, Professor Vining has greatly re~
warded us.

